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Abstract
Worldwide human trafficking is the third most often registered international criminal activity, ranked only after drug and
weapon trafficking. This article focusses on three questions: 1) How can human trafficking be measured? 2) What are the
causes and indicators of this criminal activity which exploits individuals? 3)Which countries observe a high (or low) level of
human trafficking inflow?We apply the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes structural equation model to measure human
trafficking inflows in a way which includes all potential causes and indicators in one estimation model. The human traffick-
ing measurement focusses on international human trafficking. We use freely available existing data and thus generate an
objectivemeasure of the extent of trafficking. Countries are ranked according to their potential to be a destination country
based on various characteristics of the trafficking process.
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1. Introduction
Since human trafficking is the third largest kind of illicit
international commerce, after illegal drug and weapon
smuggling (U.S. Department of State, 2004), it creates
an underground economy of illegal labor markets and
businesseswhere immense profits and great suffering go
hand in hand. Profit estimates range from1billion dollars
(Belser, 2005) to 31.61 billion dollars at any given time
(ILO, 2005; Interpol, 2012). This money is augmented by
tax evasion and presumably used to finance the illegal
businesses that traffic individuals, as well as other asso-
ciated activities. The trafficked are abused through ex-
ploitation and coercion and deprived of the freedom to
move or choose their place of living (Gallagher, 2009).
Like other transnational criminal activities, it links with
the corruption of civil society as it bypasses borders, un-
dermines state sovereignty, and threatens state gover-
nance and human security (Shelley, 1999).
The international nature of this crime means that an
international response is needed in order to address pol-
icy approaches and legal measures successfully, particu-
larly due to the fact that the main problem in this field is
the availability of comparable data. A comparable inter-
national measure of trafficking intensity is currently still
missing. This article provides a first attempt at providing
the literature with a new means of measuring human
trafficking by using the structural equation approach.1
1 Several attempts have been carried out in order to increase data access in the “Trafficking Statistics Project”: the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) built the Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM) Database; the United
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The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model
is a special case of the structural equation model which
uses existing data to derive ameasurement of the extent
of human trafficking. Thereby an index of human traffick-
ing “based on estimated parameters that relate directly
to the causes and indicators” (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, &
McCorriston, 2007, p. 445) can be drawn up. This ap-
proach has been used in economics by several authors to
explore latent phenomena such as the shadow economy
(Schneider & Enste 2000, 2002) or corruption (Dreher
et al., 2007).
In this article we understand human trafficking in ac-
cordance with the international definition of trafficking
in persons.2 This source is not only the first successful
international agreement on the common elements and
implications of human trafficking, but it also provides
an important working basis for the present research.3
The main elements are the inclusion of all forms of en-
slavement and the focus on the exploitation of victims
through coercion or deception. They acknowledge that
most of the victims of human trafficking aremade vulner-
able by migration, are not willingly enslaved, and that it
is a clandestine business of internationally active crimi-
nal networks. To render the clandestine phenomenon of
human trafficking visible, the objective of this article is
to measure human trafficking by addressing the extent
of victim exploitation in destination countries based on
observed causes and indicators through theMIMIC struc-
tural equation approach. This allows us to explore the
structural relationship between the causes and indica-
tors of human trafficking, which to the best of our knowl-
edge has not been investigated before.
In order to describe human trafficking as precisely as
possible, aspects of both indicators and causes must be
included, particularly since these have been neglected by
earlier studies, which used multivariate approaches and
focussed on factors that may cause human trafficking
(e.g. Cho, 2015). The main idea behind theMIMIC model
is to examine the relationship between an unobservable
variable, e.g. the shadow economy, corruption, human
trafficking, etc., and a set of observable variables (causes
and indicators) using covariance information (Buehn &
Schneider, 2012).4 The flexibility in estimating the corre-
lations of observable factors is one of the main advan-
tages of theMIMIC approach. We disentangle these rela-
tionships and derive an index of the extent of trafficking
in persons to destination countries by applying this single
latent variable structural equation method. This method
provides a detailed analysis of human trafficking, which
sheds further light on themechanism behind the traffick-
ing process.
To summarize in advance the essential findings, the
MIMIC estimates support the main assumptions as to
the determinants and indicators of trafficking in persons.
That is, specifically, that richer countries, investment re-
lations, and opportunities for low-skilled labor positively
correlate with human trafficking whereas language dif-
ferences are negatively correlated. Indications of human
trafficking inflows are the crime rate, legal measures
against human trafficking, and the number of migrants
registered in the countries. The human trafficking inten-
sity index shows the prevalence of human trafficking to
142 destination countries for the period 2000–2010.
Section 2 explains the MIMIC model of human traf-
ficking and presents the dynamics between indicators
and causes of human trafficking. Thereafter, Section 3
discusses the results, the measurement of human traf-
ficking, and country rankings. Section 4 concludes.
2. The MIMIC Model of Human Trafficking
In 1975, Jöreskog and Goldberger introduced the MIMIC
model in economics. It has subsequently been used in
numerous studies to measure unobservable variables
such as the underground economy (e.g. Buehn & Schnei-
der, 2012, Frey & Weck-Hanneman, 1984; Loayza, 1996;
Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 2010), corruption
(Dreher et al., 2007), and international goods smuggling
(Buehn & Farzanegan, 2012).5 Many studies further ex-
plored determining aspects and the development of un-
derground activity across and within countries (among
others Buehn, 2012; Loyaza, 1996).
There are several reasons for the application of the
MIMIC model in the context of human trafficking. Firstly,
human trafficking is an economically significant criminal
activity with huge profits linked to tax evasion. Secondly,
international human trafficking receives increased atten-
tion in the global policy arena and the international com-
munity is willing to fight it. This has already spurred an
increase in studies analyzing the underlying processes in
law, political science, and economics. However, interna-
tional trafficking in human beings is a multidimensional,
unobserved phenomenon in which the whole process
happens in the underground economy and neither traf-
fickers nor victims are easy to identify. A latent variable
approach such as the MIMIC is thus well suited to ad-
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) initiated the program against Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT); and the U.S. State Department publishes
the yearly Trafficking in Persons reports comparing countries’ legal responses towards human trafficking.
2 The definition is presented in the Palermo Protocol Article 3 (UN, 2000).
3 Article 3 of the protocol states that “human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (United Nations, 2000).
4 See Appendix for a detailed description of the MIMIC model and the generation of the factors score for the final index.
5 Additionally, Di Tommaso, Raiser andWeeks (2007) and Kuklys (2004) analyzed institutional change in Eastern Europe andwelfaremeasurement. Buehn
and Eichler (2009) explored the connection between smuggling illegal and legal goods, and Buehn and Farzanegan (2013) developed an index of global
air pollution.
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dress its unobservable nature. Through the simultaneous
consideration of key determinants and indicators, light is
shed on the presence andmagnitude of human trafficking
to a country. Thirdly, the ability to estimate the parame-
ters of a single structural equation has greater value than
estimating numerous regressions. TheMIMIC approach is
based on the assumption that causal factors of latent phe-
nomena are not to be considered independently. Human
trafficking is a process with many facets in which several
factors shape the incentive structure of all the actors in-
volved, i.e. traffickers, victims and governments.6
The application of the MIMIC model to human traf-
ficking focusses on the extent of human trafficking in
destination countries.7 We identify what drives people
to exploit vulnerable individuals, i.e. the demand struc-
ture (pull factors), and what puts people in this vulner-
able position, i.e. the potential supply (push factors). In
economic terms, human trafficking is located in a mar-
ket setting where supply and demand are met at the
expense of vulnerable individuals. The main reason for
the abuse and exploitation of people is global income
disparity. Emigration is propelled by economic factors
that drive people to migrate and take risks in order to
findmore prosperous living conditions. In particular, traf-
fickers use their victims’ vulnerability and bring them to
countrieswhere both the demand for cheap labor and ex-
ploitation profits are high. These are the key factors that
help identify the indicators and causes of human traffick-
ing to destination countries.
2.1. Indicators
The extent of human trafficking is not directly measur-
able so indicators have to be identified that are a func-
tion of human trafficking in destination countries. To the
best of our knowledge we are the first to determine mul-
tiple indicators to measure its extent in destination coun-
tries. There aremany aspects correlatedwith human traf-
ficking that could partially indicate its prevalence in a
country. After extensive research of anecdotal and gov-
ernmental evidence (e.g. U.S. Department of State, 2010,
2011, 2012, 2013), it becomes apparent that human traf-
ficking has a two-sided nature. Some consequences are
visible, but its illegal nature requiresmost of the action to
be covert. We identify four indicators of human traffick-
ing that reflect the intensity of human trafficking in desti-
nation countries: (1) the crime rate per 100,000 people,
(2) the 3P-index of anti-trafficking policies8, (3) the num-
ber of identified human trafficking victims, and (4) the
number of migrants registered in a country. In order
to test the relationship between the indicators and hu-
man trafficking intensity (η) the following measurement
model is implemented:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
crime ratei
3P-indexi
victimsi
ln migrantsi
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= [β1, β2, β3] × [η] + [ε1, ε2, ε3]
(Ad1): Awareness within countries plays an important
role in the identification of human trafficking. Given that
human trafficking is a large-scale illegal business, its in-
frastructure must be highly developed. The criminology
literature supports this claim and stresses the link be-
tween the transport of illegal migrants, human traffick-
ing, and organized crime throughout the entire process
of deceiving, transporting, and exploiting people (Salt,
2000; Salt & Stein, 1997; Schloenhardt, 2001). The ex-
tent of human trafficking in a country contributes to
the overall prevalence of crime. Despite the hidden na-
ture of the phenomenon, we are able to reveal it by
looking at the occurrence of crime, measured as the
level of crime in the country. We use the crime rate per
100,000 people taken from United Nations Surveys on
Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Sys-
tem (UnitedNationsOffice onDrugs and Crime [UNODC],
2008), which is the most complete set of cross-country
crime data available.
(Ad2): The legal fight against crime is an indicator
of the extent of human trafficking in the country. In or-
der to explain this hypothesis, we look to the theory pre-
sented in the literature (e.g. Hathaway, 2007; Simmons,
2000) as to why states sign international treaties and en-
force them domestically. This would suggest that coun-
tries which more rigorously prevent, suppress, and pun-
ish trafficking in persons are incentivized to do so be-
cause they have a higher intrinsic motivation for respect-
ing human rights and expect the collateral consequences
(such as international reputation and a strong civil so-
ciety) to be more important than the costs of enforce-
ment. The effect of enforcement on the incidence of vio-
lence, however, is not easily determined. In ameta-study
which looked exclusively at the drug market, Werb et al.
(2011) found that interference in the market for drugs
leads to an increase in violent incidents. We apply this ar-
gument to the trafficking market and argue that where
human trafficking is combated by stronger law enforce-
6 Assumptions made about the effects of the latent variable have to be considered carefully. Cliff (1983, p. 120) argues that there might be relevant diver-
gence between the observed indicators and the latent phenomenon. This is especially important when interpreting correlations and model estimates
established from the latent variable specifications and relating them directly to the unobserved phenomenon. However it should be noted that this
is not a major problem here because the model is tested on several different specifications and model applications, which show that the underlying
assumptions seem to be valid. Nevertheless, estimation models are no more than approximations of the unknown real social phenomenon and have
to be interpreted cautiously, especially when the core component being estimated (HT) is not observable.
7 Since October 2013, the Walk Free Foundation (2013) has measured the prevalence of people in slavery for 162 countries. This approach is based on
risk characteristics of countries at one point in time. In contrast to the human trafficking intensity measure provided here, the measurement does not
take into account development over time and is restricted to an analysis of the preceding year rather than of the last decade, and thus comparisons
are difficult.
8 A detailed description of the construction of the 3P-index is available in the article Cho et al. (2014) and online on the project webpage: www.human-
trafficking-research.org
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ment in terms of prosecution, protection, and preven-
tion, the more incidences of trafficking will be registered
in the country. A measure of these anti-trafficking instru-
ments is the 3P-index provided by Cho, Dreher and Neu-
mayer (2014).9 It is available for over 180 countries for
the 2001 to 2013 period. The higher the score a coun-
try receives in the 3P-index (on a scale of 3 to 15), the
more rigorously the anti-trafficking instruments are im-
plemented. Our argument is supported by the follow-
ing observations: the Convention Against Transnational
Crime and the Trafficking Protocol are the results of in-
ternational observations “that technological advances,
combined with the ever-growing inter-dependence of
economies, is offering criminal groups unprecedented
lucrative opportunities” (Betti, 2001, p. 1). During the
negotiations and the implementation of the Convention
Against Transnational Crime and the Trafficking Proto-
col, public awareness of the topic increased substan-
tially. Non-governmental organizations intensified public
awareness campaigns andmedia coverage of human traf-
ficking as an international criminal activity became ubiq-
uitous.10 The increased salience of the topic forced policy
makers to react and intensify the fight against it (Burstein,
2003, and sources cited there). In a simple correlation
test between the 3P-index and the number of identified
victims, we find a positive and significant correlation.We
therefore argue that the 3P-index is a good indicator of
human trafficking in the country.
Ad(3): The number of identified victims in these coun-
tries gives an indication of the true number of victims.
Although it is important to note that identification of vic-
tims, prosecution of traffickers, and prevention of the
crime largely depend on the awareness of the existence
of human trafficking in the wider public, as well as in le-
gal institutions (Tyldum&Brunovskis, 2005), this number
is an important sign of the existence of trafficking in per-
sons. The indicator of the observed number of victims is
a proxy for the total extent of the issue: it is only the tip
of the iceberg. This observed number is affected by the
quality of the lawenforcement institutions in the destina-
tion country. Presumably the numbers are larger in coun-
tries with better institutions and therefore not neces-
sarily where trafficking is more prevalent. However, the
number of identified victims should be larger where the
pool of all victims is larger, which suggests a positive cor-
relation between the real extent and identified victims.
In its global reports on trafficking in persons (UNODC,
2009, 2012), the UNODC provides the number of identi-
fied victims as a share of the total population for a large
set of countries.11
Ad(4): Finally, as argued before, victim exploitation
happens parallel tomigration flows andwe therefore use
the number of migrants (in logs) as an indicator of hu-
man trafficking. The number of international migrants
is available from the World Bank Development Indica-
tors (World Bank, 2012). In order to obtain data for each
year of the sample, we interpolate from the number of
refugees as counted every five years by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
2.2. Causes
The structural model includes not only all causes of hu-
man trafficking that influence the vulnerability of indi-
viduals and thereby pull them towards promising des-
tination countries but also criminal aspects of the phe-
nomenon. Since the application of the common defini-
tion of human trafficking in 2000, the number of stud-
ies on the causes of human trafficking has increased sub-
stantially (e.g. Akee, Basu, Bedi, & Chau, 2010; Cho, 2015;
Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer, 2013; Hernandez & Rudolph,
2015).12 The basic causes used in the modeling process
of the MIMIC model are: (1) income per capita in logs,
(2) foreign direct investment flows into destination coun-
tries (in logs), (3) employment in agriculture as a percent-
age of total employment in these countries, and (4) lan-
guage fractionalization within the respective destination
countries. The structural model is as follows:
[η] = [α1, α2, α3, α4] ×
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(log) GDP pci
(log) FDI stocki
employ agrii
language fracti
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+ [ω]
(Ad1): The main economic reason behind the existence
of both human traffickers and an easily exploited popu-
lation is the movement of people from regions of lower
labor productivity to those of higher productivity. Thus,
the ideal destination country for human trafficking is a
high-income country, which can accordingly become a
breeding ground for this type of activity. We use income
measured by GDP per capita (in logs) taken from the
World Bank’s (2012) Development Indicators (WDI) as a
proxy for the economic pull factor.
(Ad2): It is noted that international investment rela-
tions lead to increased cultural, social, and economic in-
terrelation between countries. These are therefore are
an additional pull factor for human trafficking, which can
be interpreted as the negative externality of increased in-
ternational connectedness and as being facilitated by dif-
ferent aspects of globalization processes. Interconnect-
9 We apply the overall index (3P-index) in order to avoid judging the importance of each of the single components. The fight against human trafficking is
based on all three equally important aspects.
10 See Ditmore andWijers (2003) for details on the negotiations of the Trafficking Protocol. For an example of media coverage see Spiegel Online (2014).
11 An overview of all variables used can be found in Table A1.
12All determinants used in the empirical literature so far are tested in the meta-study by Cho (2015) where she identifies robust causes of human traffick-
ing flows. Contrary to Cho’s approach, we focus on causal and indicating variables at the same time and apply theMIMIC model. In this way we add one
layer of information to the one she uses. Nevertheless, the push and pull factors identified in Cho’s study (2015) have been considered in various tests
of our MIMIC model. In the final model we decided to focus on the determinants that have been robustly identified as causes of human trafficking in
our setting and are in accordance with the model fit of our estimation technique.
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edness facilitates transport via the establishment of in-
ternational trade routes and investment connections. In-
ternational crime groups are large-scale business oper-
ations that are active in both the official and the infor-
mal economies, corrupting officials and legal networks
(UNODC, 2010). The variable used is the share of foreign
direct investment (FDI) (in logs), which shows these con-
nections (UNCTAD, 2012).13
(Ad3): Most cases of human trafficking involve mi-
grant workers in economic sectors such as agriculture
and construction (Zhang, 2012). They account for 18 per-
cent of identified cases of human trafficking according
to the UNODC (2009). The increased chances of employ-
ment caused by the increased demand for cheap un-
skilled labor increases the attractiveness of countries as
destinations for migrant workers (Hernandez & Rudolph,
2015).14 In addition, high demand in the commercial sex
market or other informal markets increases the probabil-
ity of people being pushed towards these locations (Cho
et al., 2013; Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006; Jakobson
&Kotsadam, 2013). Given the scarcity of data in this area,
we are obliged to refrain from using sexual exploitation
data and use agricultural employment given as a percent-
age of total employment, in data provided by the World
Bank (2012).15
(Ad4): On the other hand, trafficking may be limited
by technological advances and personal contacts. These
increase the availability of information on migration op-
portunities and job offers and thus presumably reduce
the risk of being trafficked. Therefore information flows
should have a restricting effect on trafficking. We em-
ploy the language component of the distance-adjusted
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (DELF) developed
by Kollo (2012)16 using the variable in the WDI data set
(World Bank, 2012).
Figure 1 shows the respective path diagram and ex-
pected relations for the MIMIC model of human traffick-
ing, which combines the measurement and the struc-
tural model.
3. Results
Before estimating theMIMICmodels, we usemultiple im-
putation with fixed country and year effects to balance
the sample and control for unobserved factors. Subse-
quently, the MIMIC models are estimated using a maxi-
mum likelihood estimator with missing values. After test-
ing for the robustness of the specification and evalu-
ating the model fit, the final indices are generated for
the years 2000 to 2010. In this way country rankings
for every single country-year combination are generated,
which makes it possible to assess the development of
the extent of human trafficking over time. As discussed
above, the decade 2000–2010 saw a rise in quantitative
research on human trafficking, encouraged by theUnited
Nations’ official definition of trafficking in persons of
2000. Given the availability of data, the years between
2000 and 2010 appear to be the most useful for empiri-
cally exploring the major causes and indicators.
Since structural equation modeling (SEM) is confir-
mative in nature, the significance of variables is only one
indication of model quality. When it is considered to-
Language frac.
EmployAgri
(ln) FDI
HT
intensity
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
–
(ln) GDP pc
(ln) Migrants
Vicm share
3P-index
Crime rate
Figure 1. Path diagram of MIMIC models.
13 It has also been argued that spatial dependence works as a trigger for positive externalities such as the spillover effect of advancing women’s rights
(Neumayer & De Soysa, 2011). We argue that this link can also act as a transport system for negative externalities, such as international criminal
networks transporting human beings.
14 South-south migrants in particular have to rely on informal support systems rather than welfare benefits in their host countries, which makes them
even more vulnerable (Avato, Koettle, & Sabates-Wheeler, 2010).
15 We refer to Jakobson and Kotsadam (2016) for a detailed discussion of trafficking for sexual exploitation: its causes, indicators, and available data
sources. Their analysis shows the scarcity of available data and supports our endeavour to develop a measure of human trafficking.
16 This index accounts for (dis-)similarities between languages, which are crucial in human trafficking because potential victims aremore vulnerable if the
destination country’s language is different from their own. These new data are an improvement on those of Cho (2015) and Akee, Basu, Chau, & Khamis
(2010) who use the ethnic fractionalization index (ELF) of Alesina et al. (2003). The ELF only considers the number of different languages in a country,
thereby disregarding the crucial aspect of the distance between languages accounted for in the DELF. This is relevant in the context of the trafficking
process. The results are not qualitatively different when the ELF index is employed.
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gether with the overall fit of the model, both these as-
pects are enough to reject or confirm the assumed rela-
tionships (Bollen, 1989). The judgment of the quality of
themodel is based onwhether the estimated covariance
is equal or close to the true sample covariance.17
3.1. MIMIC Estimation Results
Table 1 shows the results of the MIMIC estimation. The
fit indicators show a goodmodel fit. In particular, the chi-
square statistic with a p-value of 0.02 indicates a good
model fit. The results are point estimates. The observed
correlation of GDP per capita is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level, indicating that wealthier countries
are more often the destination of human trafficking. In-
vestment flows into destination countries are also pos-
itively associated with human trafficking (at the 5 per-
cent significance level). More international business and
investments are correlated with illicit human movement
in the form of human trafficking. The robust positive re-
lation observed (significant at the 1 percent level) to the
share of employment in agriculture endorses the posi-
tive relation between human trafficking and opportuni-
ties for cheap employment (low skilled labor), which pro-
vides more potential placements for use by traffickers
to exploit people. Linguistic fractionalizationwithin coun-
tries has a negative and significant relation to trafficking
at the 10 percent level. This suggests that less diverse
countries pull more human trafficking into the country.
Turning to the measurement model, we find that all
indicators match our expectations. One of the indicators
of the latent variable has to be normalized and used as
an anchor variable for the scale and identification: the
crime rate.18 We follow the literature by using the indi-
catorwith the largest standardized coefficient (0.891***)
as the anchor variable (e.g. Buehn & Schneider, 2012;
Dreher et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2010). All four indi-
cators are positively related to the extent of human traf-
ficking, which is in line with theoretical considerations
and economic intuition. The 3P-index of anti-trafficking
policies turns positive and significant at the 1 percent
level. This shows the importance of the extent of anti-
trafficking policies, which protect victims, prosecute traf-
fickers, and prevent human trafficking, as a reflection of
the intensity of human trafficking in the country. The
number of identified victims as a share of the population
is not statistically significant. The low quality of the data
would explain this finding (Laczko & Gozdziak, 2005). Fi-
nally and importantly, the share of migrants in the coun-
try positively indicates the prevalence of human traffick-
ing (although this relation is not statistically significant at
conventional levels).
We have carried out a number of robustness tests
to check whether the results are valid under a vari-
ety of circumstances (Table 2). The results do not de-
pend on the choice of estimation model and discount
the three highest and lowest ranking countries (outliers)
(Buehn & Farzanegan, 2012). In order to rule out en-
dogeneity concerns, we have also estimated the results
following Dreher et al. (2007) and lagged all quantita-
tive causal variables by one period before estimating
the model. We have also followed Dreher et al. (2007)
and tested whether it is a problem that some of the
indicators could well be causal variables (such as the
Table 1.MIMIC estimates.
Structural model (causes) Measurement model (indicators)
(ln) GDP pc (ln) FDI Employment Language Crime rate Overall Victim share (ln) Migrants
in agriculture fractionalization 3P-index
0.978*** 0.172** 0.438*** –0.124* 1 0.438*** 0.036 0.118
(6.656) (2.248) (2.786) (1.751) (6.000) (0.302) (1.105)
Number Chi-square P-value RMSEA Probability CFI TLI CD
of countries RMSEA < 0.05
142 27.75 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.90 0.84 0.61
Notes: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; The crime rate is chosen as the anchor variable
and normalized to 1. If the model fits the data perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals
the covariance matrix implied by the model with small Chi-square values. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA)
evaluates the fit of the model based on the deviance between the estimated and the real covariance. Brown and Cudeck (1993)
assume that RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 imply a good model fit, which corresponds to a probability close to 1. The two fit indices
suggested by Bentler (1990) are the comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). They indicate a good model fit with val-
ues close to 1 (Hu&Bentler, 1999). The coefficient of determination (CD) is similar to the R-squaredwith higher values showing better fit.
17 Iacobucci (2010) provides a more detailed description of all goodness of fit indices in structural equation modelling. Barrett (2007), who argues that
decision rules based on these indicators are arbitrary, provides a critical assessment of the use of goodness of fit indicators. He argues that the chi-
square statistic is the “only substantive test of fit for SEM” (p. 815).
18 The choice of the anchor variable does not change estimation results qualitatively (Bollen, 1989). Tests show that this is true for the setting in this
article as well.
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Table 2.MIMIC estimates (robustness tests).
(1) (2) (3)
Structural model (ln) GDP per capita 1.051*** 0.721***
(causes) (5.497) (5.688)
(ln) FDI 0.112 0.183***
(1.039) (2.869)
EmployAgri 0.391* 0.250*
(1.801) (1.867)
Language fract. –0.159 –0.093 –0.127*
(1.628) (1.583) (1.784)
lagged (ln) GDP pc 0.968***
(6.686)
lagged (ln) FDI 0.177**
(2.333)
lagged EmployAgri 0.432***
(2.795)
Measurement model Crime rate 1 1 1
(indicators) Overall 3P-index 0.633*** 0.706*** 0.686***
(6.773) (5.053) (6.014)
Share of victims 0.038 –0.082 0.035
(0.319) (0.567) (0.298)
(ln) Migrants 0.289** 0.028 0.117
(2.432) (0.220) (1.107)
Fit statistics Number of countries 84 136 142
Chi-square 30.89 28.17 26.96
(P-value) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Notes: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Explanation of fit statistics see Table 1.
crime rate or migration).19 The results are qualitatively
unchanged.20
3.2. Human Trafficking Index
The human trafficking index provides an assessment of
human trafficking relative to other countries in all dimen-
sions of the process. As described in Section 2, human
trafficking includes all forms of exploitation and all groups
of actors involved, traffickers as well as victims. We fo-
cus on the destination countries where exploitation takes
place. Thus, we conceive of the extent of human traffick-
ing in these countries as a bundle of actions and decisions.
This includes the decision of traffickers to send individu-
als to these countries and exploit them. Additionally, it
includes the extent of a market failure which provides
opportunities for the exploitation of victims through the
demand for cheap labor as well as the share of the pop-
ulation which is vulnerable and marginalized and there-
fore easily exploited. This shows that creating a clear pic-
ture of the extent and dimensions of human trafficking in
countries is still very difficult. However, the derived index
and subsequent ranking of countries is superior to exist-
ing measurements of specific aspects of human traffick-
ing. For example, the tier score of the U.S. Department of
State (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), which only addresses compli-
ance with U.S. policies, has been criticized as a one-sided
approach that reflects political interest rather than the
will to produce a transparent independent score of the
variety of international policy approaches (Simmons &
Lloyd, 2010).21 By contrast, the underlying data imple-
mented in the construction of our intensity index (human
trafficking index) are based on publicly available data of
causes and indicators that influence human trafficking by
the means which have been described.
The relevance of the measure is assessed in the fol-
lowing Table 3, where we show the pairwise correla-
tions of the human trafficking index with the 3P-anti-
trafficking policy index, the tier rank of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, and the citation index compiled by the
UNODC (2006, 2009, 2012).22
19 These results are available from the authors upon request.
20 An important issue in using the MIMIC approach is whether the assumption that the variables identify one latent factor holds. Using a principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA), results show that one component is sufficiently explained by the variation in variables, suggesting that our assumption of one
latent factor (human trafficking intensity) holds.
21 Simmons and Lloyd (2010) criticize the ranking of countries by the Department of State for mirroring the political interests of the U.S.A. and suggest
that it eventually serves to get other countries to comply with the norms set out by the country depicted as the world’s referee.
22 We do not include the Global Slavery Index in our assessment here, since it mainly refers to countries where victims originate.
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Table 3. Pairwise correlations of human trafficking indices.
Human trafficking index Overall 3P-index Tier rank CI: destination CI: origin
Human trafficking index 1
Overall 3P-index 0.6647* 1
Tier rank 0.5910* 0.7290* 1
CI: destination 0.4912* 0.3835* 0.2787* 1
CI: origin –0.3868* –0.0493 –0.1762* –0.0743* 1
Notes: * p < 0.01; The tier rank is reversed and shows higher values the better countries fulfil the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act (TVPA) standards. CI: destination/origin refers to the citation index compiled by the UNODC. The countries are ranked in
a five-category scale with the highest value indicating that the probability of being a destination/origin country is “very high”.
The correlations show that the human trafficking in-
dex has a high positive correlation with the 3P-index.
Countries that rank high in fighting human trafficking
have a higher intensity of trafficking inflows (as assumed
in Section 2 and shown in Table 2). Similarly, we see a pos-
itive correlation between the tier rank and the citation
index of destination countries, as well as a negative cor-
relation to the citation index of countries of origin. One
could argue that the correlation between the latter three
indices is only modest (0.59 to 0.39, respectively). How-
ever, this is attributed to the different aspects of human
trafficking that they measure. The tier rank addresses
compliance with the TVPA and thus political decisions to
fight human trafficking. This is only one aspect of the pro-
cess of trafficking in human beings and a partial aspect
of our intensity index, which also captures country char-
acteristics, as well as the criminal dimension and vulner-
ability of victims. The same holds true for the citation in-
dices: both indices capture aspects of human trafficking
which are visible to society and therefore receive public
attention. In the MIMIC model the crime rate, numbers
of identified victims, and migration levels are used as
indicators and combined with the causes—this ensures
that this aspect of the trafficking process is included in
the intensity index to provide a holistic picture.
3.3. Country Rankings
Looking at Table 4 we find mainly OECD countries lead-
ing the ranking of destination countries. The table shows
the twenty top and bottom ranking countries in the
years 2001, 2005, 2010. At the lower end of the rank-
ing, we find Asian, Latin-American and Sub-Saharan
African countries with a low prevalence of trafficking into
their countries.
Unsurprisingly industrialized countries are at the top
of the ranking. This is in line with the observations in the
UNODC report (2006, p. 17). Countries in North America
and Europe, as well as Australia are reported to be the
top destination countries for human trafficking. The fact
that Scandinavian countries rank so highly indicates that
there are hidden activities taking place in these countries
which enable traffickers to exploit individuals. This is less
surprising than it seemswhen their geographical location
is taken into account, particularly considering that they
are often used as role models for institutional quality.
They are close to Russia and Eastern European countries,
which have lower economic opportunities and, in Rus-
sia’s case at times, a higher level of persecution of indi-
viduals (traffickers and victims alike). Thus, they are very
attractive destinations for the vulnerable and desperate
in these countries as well as Middle Eastern, African, and
Asian nations. It is also in line with the observation that
the share of identified victims in these countries is quite
high, especially at the beginning of the century.23
Looking atmajor OECD countries, the United States—
the country which has pushed initiatives against human
trafficking such as the implementation of anti-trafficking
instruments—consistently ranks among the top 20 coun-
tries and even leads the ranking in 2010. This relatively
constant position suggests that despite theUnited States’
intense anti-trafficking efforts and awareness campaigns
run locally and internationally, the magnitude of the
problem within its borders seems to be stable and has
even worsened recently with a higher intensity in 2010
(index value of 79). Finally, Germany ranks among the
top ten countries throughout the years, which confirms
reports of a high magnitude of human trafficking in
the country.
At the lower end of the list are mainly low-income
countries, which act as a source rather than a destination
for victims of human trafficking. There are some (rather
surprising) variations in the ranking of some countries.
We attribute these to different aspects of the traffick-
ing process. Firstly, from the perspective of the traffick-
ers, it should make sense to use established trafficking
routes. However, as a way of hiding from criminal justice
systems, variations in destination countries may serve to
reduce the chances of getting caught. Secondly, from the
perspective of the victims, the same holds true for migra-
tion routes and observed travel patterns. Finally, from
the perspective of a state fighting human trafficking, a
series of legal successes in one year may serve to make
the problem more visible but may not be repeated in
the next. In countries such as Brunei Darussalam or the
United Arab Emirates, an autocratic state may be able to
23 The share of victims in Iceland and Norway in 2000 was 10.4 per 100,000 people, which is one of the highest shares of identified victims across all
countries during the decade observed.
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Table 4. Highest and lowest ranking countries in specific years.
Country Rank 2001 Country Rank 2005 Country Rank 2010
highest ranking countries
Belgium 1 (89) United Kingdom 1 (83) United States 1 (79)
Iceland 2 (87) Netherlands 2 (81) Canada 2 (75)
Netherlands 3 (85) Norway 3 (81) Switzerland 3 (72)
Germany 4 (84) Belgium 4 (79) Norway 4 (72)
Luxembourg 5 (83) Sweden 5 (78) France 5 (72)
Sweden 6 (83) Germany 6 (77) United Kingdom 6 (72)
Denmark 7 (81) Denmark 7 (77) Brunei Darussalam 7 (72)
Switzerland 8 (81) Luxembourg 8 (77) Australia 8 (72)
Norway 9 (81) Australia 9 (75) Germany 9 (71)
Canada 10 (80) Iceland 10 (75) Luxembourg 10 (71)
United Kingdom 11 (79) Ireland 11 (75) Sweden 11 (71)
Ireland 12 (78) Switzerland 12 (75) Belgium 12 (71)
Austria 13 (78) Austria 13 (74) Qatar 13 (71)
Finland 14 (76) France 14 (73) Israel 14 (71)
France 15 (76) Spain 15 (73) Netherlands 15 (71)
Brunei Darussalam 16 (76) Italy 16 (72) Ireland 16 (70)
Spain 17 (75) Portugal 17 (72) United Arab Emirates 17 (70)
United States 18 (73) New Zealand 18 (71) Austria 18 (69)
Australia 19 (73) United States 19 (71) Italy 19 (69)
The Bahamas 20 (72) Finland 20 (70) Denmark 20 (68)
lowest ranking countries
Philippines 122 (36) Peru 122 (36) Sierra Leone 122 (37)
Kenya 123 (35) Kyrgyz Republic 123 (36) Bangladesh 123 (37)
Gambia 124 (34) Uganda 124 (35) Yemen 124 (37)
Nepal 125 (34) Gambia 125 (35) Vietnam 125 (36)
Uzbekistan 126 (34) Bolivia 126 (35) Zambia 126 (36)
Liberia 127 (34) Nepal 127 (34) Uganda 127 (36)
Kyrgyz Republic 128 (31) Kenya 128 (33) Tajikistan 128 (36)
Mali 129 (31) Sierra Leone 129 (33) Cambodia 129 (36)
Iran 130 (30) Mali 130 (31) Gambia 130 (36)
Uganda 131 (30) Madagascar 131 (31) Kyrgyz Republic 131 (36)
Sierra Leone 132 (28) Algeria 132 (31) Tanzania 132 (36)
Senegal 133 (26) Syria 133 (31) Mongolia 133 (36)
Sudan 134 (26) Ethiopia 134 (30) Lesotho 134 (35)
Malawi 135 (25) Sudan 135 (30) Ethiopia 135 (35)
Niger 136 (24) Senegal 136 (29) Niger 136 (34)
Burundi 137 (23) Ghana 137 (28) Mozambique 137 (32)
Ethiopia 138 (23) Iraq 138 (27) Zimbabwe 138 (31)
Tajikistan 139 (23) Niger 139 (25) Malawi 139 (28)
Ghana 140 (23) Burundi 140 (25) Liberia 140 (27)
Madagascar 141 (20) Liberia 141 (20) Burundi 141 (25)
Cuba 142 (12) Cuba 142 (7) Madagascar 142 (22)
Note: The columns indicate the ranks of the countries and their respective index scores (in parentheses) on a scale from 1 to 100 in the
years 2001, 2005, and 2010.
hide the problem from the public eye more effectively
than democratic states with checks and balances.
4. Conclusion
Human trafficking is a global phenomenon of large pro-
portions. People are exploited, live in inhumane condi-
tions, and lack food or access to health facilities, espe-
cially in high-income countries. The article disentangles
the relationships between indicators and causes of hu-
man trafficking by employing a structural equation ap-
proach (MIMIC) and ranking 142 countries over a ten-
year period according to the prevalence of human traf-
ficking within their borders.
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Our approach goes beyond existing studies by includ-
ing both causal factors and indicators while acknowledg-
ing the illicit nature of the phenomenon. The causes mir-
ror the incentive structure for traffickers, which is in-
tended to maximize their chances of making high prof-
its while maintaining a low probability of detection. Fur-
thermore, the causes also capture the vulnerability of
trafficking victims by addressing their incentives tomove
in the first place, a decision which leaves them vulnera-
ble to false promises of better opportunities. By travel-
ling from a poorer country to a wealthier one, individu-
als are inherently vulnerable: this is especially the case
as linguistic fractionalization is negatively related to in-
tensity. The indicators, on the other hand, show the re-
sults in countries where illegal trafficking of human be-
ings takes place. Human trafficking is observed in coun-
tries with high crime levels, e.g. a larger underground
economy running parallel to migration flows. The num-
bers of identified victims together with the number of
migrants are indicators of the phenomenon and describe
the visible extent of the problem. The dimensions of the
fight against human trafficking (3P-index) quantify the
application of anti-trafficking policies within countries.
The pattern of the development of human traffick-
ing over the observed period is in line with expecta-
tions. Developed countries rank high and display a large
amount of trafficking within their borders. These coun-
tries are the primary targets for traffickers, presumably
because the potential for large profits is greatest in
wealthier countries. The lowest ranking countries are
mainly countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, where many people flee their miserable living
conditions and look for other opportunities inmore pros-
perous countries.
In terms of policy implications, we highlight that we
have estimated a country-specific measurement. One
should keep in mind that human trafficking is a transna-
tional problem and that the fight against this crime is
best conducted at both ends of the trafficking route:
in both destination and source countries in a coherent
manner across policy fields and jurisdictions. Addition-
ally, the allocation of resources on the supranational
level, e.g. to Interpol or other international organizations,
might be best suited to address and fight all aspects of
human trafficking.
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Appendix
Table A1. Data and sources.
Variables Description Sources
(log) GDP per capita GDP per capita in constant US$ (2005) World Bank (2012)
(log) FDI stock share Inward and outward FDI stock as percentage of GDP UNCTAD (2012)
Employment in agriculture Share of employment in agriculture as percentage World Bank (2012)
(percent of total) of total employment
International migrants Number of (officially registered) international migrants World Bank (2012)
(share) in the country as share of total population
Refugees by country Number of (officially registered) refugees in the country World Bank (2012)
of origin per 100,000 of local population
East Asia and the Pacific Dummy indicating countries lying in East Asia and the World Bank (2012)
(region dummy) Pacific region according to the World Bank
Linguistic fractionalization Linguistic fractionalization in countries as part of the distance Kollo (2012),
adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (DELF); 0-1, Alesina et al. (2003)
larger values indicating larger linguistic dissimilarities
Crime rate Crime rate in the country per 100,000 people UNODC (2008)
OECD membership Dummy for OECD countries OECD (2012)
Victims Number of identified human trafficking victims in destination UNODC (2009, 2012)
countries coded by the UNODC in their Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons
3P-anti-trafficking index Anti-trafficking policy index which shows the application of Cho, Dreher and
and sub-components anti-trafficking instruments in countries; 3–15, larger values Neumayer (2014)
(prosecution, protection, indicating more compliance; Sub-components are the policy
prevention) instruments applicable ranging from 1–5
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United Kingdom 9 (79) 11 (79) 4 (90) 4 (79) 5 (79) 1 (83) 1 (76) 7 (73) 10 (71) 5 (81) 6 (72)
Netherlands 7 (79) 3 (85) 8 (86) 9 (76) 7 (78) 2 (81) 3 (75) 3 (76) 6 (74) 4 (81) 15 (71)
Norway 12 (78) 9 (81) 3 (90) 1 (81) 1 (96) 3 (81) 8 (72) 8 (73) 7 (74) 2 (83) 4 (72)
Belgium 5 (81) 1 (89) 2 (91) 6 (78) 9 (76) 4 (79) 7 (72) 2 (76) 2 (78) 3 (83) 12 (71)
Sweden 13 (77) 6 (83) 10 (84) 7 (76) 12 (74) 5 (78) 4 (75) 6 (75) 5 (75) 1 (85) 11 (71)
Germany 8 (79) 4 (84) 6 (87) 3 (79) 2 (82) 6 (77) 11 (70) 16 (67) 18 (66) 11 (76) 9 (71)
Denmark 16 (76) 7 (81) 5 (88) 2 (81) 10 (75) 7 (77) 5 (73) 5 (75) 4 (77) 9 (79) 20 (68)
Luxembourg 6 (79) 5 (83) 7 (86) 8 (76) 18 (70) 8 (77) 6 (73) 4 (76) 1 (79) 7 (81) 10 (71)
Australia 17 (75) 19 (73) 18 (73) 14 (74) 3 (82) 9 (75) 16 (68) 13 (68) 13 (68) 8 (79) 8 (72)
Iceland 25 (71) 2 (87) 1 (100) 12 (74) 22 (67) 10 (75) 2 (75) 1 (81) 3 (77) 6 (81) 29 (63)
Ireland 15 (76) 12 (78) 12 (80) 18 (71) 25 (64) 11 (75) 22 (66) 23 (66) 12 (68) 17 (73) 16 (70)
Switzerland 3 (82) 8 (81) 14 (79) 11 (75) 20 (68) 12 (75) 10 (70) 11 (70) 9 (72) 19 (71) 3 (72)
Austria 19 (73) 13 (78) 11 (81) 13 (74) 15 (72) 13 (74) 12 (70) 9 (72) 8 (73) 10 (76) 18 (69)
France 11 (78) 15 (76) 13 (80) 16 (73) 8 (77) 14 (73) 15 (68) 18 (67) 25 (65) 13 (74) 5 (72)
Spain 22 (72) 17 (75) 15 (76) 15 (74) 13 (73) 15 (73) 21 (66) 28 (64) 17 (66) 21 (69) 21 (67)
Italy 21 (73) 22 (71) 20 (72) 10 (75) 6 (79) 16 (72) 14 (68) 22 (66) 22 (66) 18 (72) 19 (69)
Portugal 30 (63) 23 (71) 17 (74) 19 (69) 19 (70) 17 (72) 26 (65) 21 (66) 19 (66) 24 (66) 32 (60)
New Zealand 14 (77) 21 (72) 19 (73) 21 (67) 16 (71) 18 (71) 18 (67) 17 (67) 27 (64) 16 (73) 22 (67)
United States 2 (83) 18 (73) 9 (85) 5 (79) 4 (81) 19 (71) 13 (70) 19 (67) 15 (67) 14 (74) 1 (79)
Finland 23 (72) 14 (76) 21 (72) 35 (59) 28 (63) 20 (70) 9 (71) 10 (72) 11 (71) 12 (75) 26 (65)
Singapore 26 (70) 29 (64) 25 (66) 66 (49) 66 (51) 21 (68) 19 (67) 31 (62) 24 (65) 35 (60) 24 (66)
Lebanon 43 (57) 62 (51) 29 (64) 31 (62) 65 (51) 22 (67) 76 (49) 62 (53) 49 (56) 79 (48) 61 (51)
Canada 4 (82) 10 (80) 16 (75) 17 (72) 14 (73) 23 (67) 17 (68) 32 (62) 26 (65) 15 (74) 2 (75)
Japan 27 (67) 46 (55) 54 (53) 37 (59) 41 (57) 24 (67) 53 (54) 60 (53) 41 (58) 46 (56) 25 (66)
Korea, Rep. 34 (61) 34 (62) 31 (63) 26 (64) 17 (71) 25 (66) 34 (62) 37 (61) 32 (62) 27 (65) 30 (62)
Czech Republic 36 (59) 24 (69) 23 (70) 25 (64) 29 (63) 26 (66) 20 (67) 14 (68) 20 (66) 22 (68) 38 (57)
Croatia 45 (56) 38 (58) 43 (58) 60 (51) 27 (64) 27 (65) 30 (63) 12 (68) 28 (64) 23 (66) 49 (55)
Slovenia 38 (59) 33 (62) 30 (63) 22 (66) 23 (65) 28 (64) 28 (64) 15 (67) 16 (66) 20 (69) 31 (60)
Poland 49 (55) 28 (64) 24 (69) 28 (64) 21 (68) 29 (64) 31 (63) 33 (62) 34 (60) 28 (65) 44 (56)
Turkey 47 (55) 74 (47) 55 (52) 44 (57) 50 (55) 30 (62) 47 (56) 49 (56) 65 (52) 38 (59) 39 (57)
Lithuania 55 (53) 37 (59) 35 (62) 20 (68) 24 (65) 31 (61) 25 (65) 26 (65) 38 (59) 47 (56) 54 (53)
Cyprus 32 (63) 27 (64) 26 (65) 43 (57) 35 (60) 32 (60) 33 (62) 35 (61) 21 (66) 33 (61) 33 (59)
Greece 31 (63) 36 (60) 38 (60) 47 (54) 64 (51) 33 (60) 41 (58) 47 (56) 40 (58) 29 (64) 27 (65)
Israel 20 (73) 32 (62) 27 (65) 50 (54) 42 (57) 34 (60) 36 (61) 41 (59) 42 (58) 26 (65) 14 (71)
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 83 (45) 70 (49) 48 (56) 34 (61) 34 (60) 35 (60) 49 (55) 42 (58) 53 (54) 39 (58) 92 (45)
United Arab
Emirates 10 (79) 59 (52) 32 (63) 39 (58) 77 (46) 36 (60) 62 (52) 57 (54) 44 (57) 36 (59) 17 (70)
Trinidad and
Tobago 51 (55) 31 (63) 36 (61) 41 (58) 59 (53) 37 (59) 29 (63) 27 (65) 37 (59) 62 (53) 57 (52)
Chile 40 (58) 35 (61) 41 (58) 81 (47) 49 (55) 38 (59) 35 (62) 36 (61) 31 (62) 25 (65) 51 (55)
Swaziland 85 (44) 50 (54) 34 (62) 30 (62) 53 (54) 39 (59) 103 (42) 84 (48) 85 (48) 86 (46) 96 (44)
Brunei
Darussalam 1 (83) 16 (76) 50 (55) 32 (61) 11 (75) 40 (58) 43 (57) 58 (53) 70 (51) 68 (52) 7 (72)
Congo, Rep. 67 (49) 30 (63) 33 (62) 42 (57) 44 (56) 41 (58) 24 (66) 20 (67) 51 (55) 48 (56) 100 (43)
Belarus 81 (46) 100 (41) 65 (50) 29 (62) 37 (59) 42 (57) 108 (42) 74 (50) 79 (50) 58 (54) 60 (51)
Hungary 42 (58) 26 (65) 39 (59) 45 (56) 55 (54) 43 (57) 27 (64) 24 (66) 33 (61) 31 (62) 46 (55)
Estonia 37 (59) 40 (57) 69 (48) 99 (42) 88 (45) 44 (56) 46 (56) 39 (60) 30 (63) 41 (57) 45 (55)
Maldives 72 (48) 52 (54) 66 (49) 55 (52) 40 (57) 45 (56) 23 (66) 25 (65) 66 (52) 99 (43) 87 (46)
Malta 44 (57) 25 (67) 28 (65) 33 (61) 45 (56) 46 (56) 32 (62) 29 (64) 23 (65) 30 (63) 63 (50)
Albania 78 (46) 83 (45) 44 (57) 38 (58) 38 (58) 47 (56) 79 (48) 73 (51) 69 (52) 51 (55) 72 (49)
Slovak Republic 50 (55) 41 (57) 45 (57) 63 (50) 69 (50) 48 (56) 38 (59) 30 (63) 29 (64) 32 (61) 40 (57)
Thailand 71 (48) 49 (54) 37 (60) 27 (64) 30 (63) 49 (56) 51 (55) 44 (56) 55 (54) 70 (51) 68 (50)
Bahamas, The 28 (64) 20 (72) 22 (72) 23 (66) 33 (60) 50 (55) 39 (59) 34 (62) 14 (67) 34 (61) 50 (55)
Romania 69 (48) 39 (57) 46 (57) 24 (65) 26 (64) 51 (54) 57 (53) 43 (57) 46 (57) 52 (55) 69 (49)
Brazil 70 (48) 71 (49) 64 (50) 59 (52) 52 (54) 52 (54) 64 (52) 70 (51) 67 (52) 72 (50) 66 (50)
Turkmenistan 94 (42) 82 (45) 57 (52) 46 (55) 70 (49) 53 (54) 128 (33) 115 (39) 98 (44) 107 (38) 109 (41)
Tunisia 86 (44) 45 (55) 42 (58) 36 (59) 108 (41) 54 (52) 88 (46) 77 (49) 68 (52) 103 (42) 108 (42)
Colombia 82 (45) 63 (51) 49 (56) 48 (54) 57 (53) 55 (52) 48 (55) 52 (55) 54 (54) 50 (55) 88 (46)
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Morocco 93 (42) 113 (38) 78 (45) 56 (52) 67 (50) 56 (52) 70 (50) 76 (50) 83 (48) 98 (43) 98 (43)
Russian
Federation 52 (54) 75 (47) 97 (41) 77 (48) 83 (46) 57 (52) 44 (57) 55 (55) 78 (50) 67 (52) 37 (57)
Kazakhstan 60 (51) 55 (53) 60 (51) 51 (53) 46 (56) 58 (52) 71 (50) 63 (52) 59 (53) 43 (56) 41 (57)
Latvia 46 (55) 51 (54) 53 (53) 53 (52) 43 (57) 59 (51) 42 (58) 46 (56) 50 (56) 40 (58) 43 (56)
Ecuador 79 (46) 64 (51) 94 (42) 125 (36) 134 (30) 60 (51) 66 (52) 61 (53) 73 (50) 66 (52) 71 (49)
Botswana 75 (47) 60 (52) 61 (51) 52 (53) 63 (52) 61 (51) 74 (50) 105 (43) 95 (45) 95 (43) 62 (51)
Bulgaria 87 (44) 88 (44) 80 (45) 54 (52) 31 (61) 62 (51) 40 (59) 38 (60) 35 (59) 42 (57) 80 (47)
Mexico 48 (55) 48 (55) 75 (46) 87 (46) 90 (45) 63 (51) 59 (53) 45 (56) 60 (53) 54 (54) 52 (54)
Qatar 18 (74) 43 (56) 47 (56) 111 (40) 117 (37) 64 (51) 55 (54) 71 (51) 39 (59) 59 (54) 13 (71)
Bahrain 33 (62) 42 (56) 58 (52) 80 (47) 106 (41) 65 (51) 63 (52) 64 (52) 36 (59) 45 (56) 35 (58)
Panama 61 (51) 54 (53) 63 (50) 86 (46) 82 (46) 66 (50) 45 (57) 51 (55) 43 (57) 49 (55) 55 (52)
Armenia 114 (37) 101 (41) 81 (44) 49 (54) 102 (42) 67 (50) 68 (51) 67 (52) 72 (50) 76 (49) 102 (43)
Ukraine 95 (42) 93 (43) 108 (39) 64 (50) 95 (44) 68 (50) 78 (49) 75 (50) 76 (50) 89 (45) 91 (45)
Zambia 121 (35) 77 (47) 87 (43) 57 (52) 60 (53) 69 (50) 83 (48) 89 (46) 96 (45) 83 (46) 126 (36)
Dominican
Republic 77 (47) 4 (45) 82 (44) 107 (41) 104 (42) 70 (50) 67 (51) 68 (52) 57 (53) 84 (46) 70 (49)
Cambodia 127 (33) 103 (41) 113 (38) 75 (48) 101 (42) 71 (49) 91 (45) 72 (51) 92 (46) 81 (47) 129 (36)
Gabon 59 (51) 87 (44) 102 (40) 109 (41) 36 (60) 72 (49) 89 (46) 102 (44) 90 (46) 85 (46) 47 (55)
Costa Rica 68 (49) 61 (51) 83 (44) 69 (49) 86 (46) 73 (49) 58 (53) 66 (52) 48 (56) 60 (54) 74 (49)
Azerbaijan 118 (36) 91 (44) 91 (43) 119 (37) 120 (37) 74 (49) 65 (52) 86 (47) 86 (48) 90 (45) 77 (48)
Tanzania 124 (34) 108 (40) 71 (48) 92 (44) 92 (44) 75 (48) 97 (44) 98 (44) 113 (39) 106 (40) 132 (36)
El Salvador 104 (39) 79 (46) 100 (40) 67 (49) 93 (44) 76 (48) 54 (54) 59 (53) 58 (53) 74 (49) 107 (42)
Honduras 115 (36) 86 (45) 104 (40) 115 (39) 123 (36) 77 (48) 60 (53) 53 (55) 62 (53) 69 (52) 116 (39)
Venezuela,
RB 62 (51) 58 (52) 95 (42) 134 (32) 137 (27) 78 (47) 84 (48) 85 (47) 80 (49) 78 (48) 56 (52)
Georgia 99 (41) 120 (37) 126 (32) 90 (45) 75 (47) 79 (47) 50 (55) 54 (55) 64 (52) 55 (54) 85 (46)
Argentina 56 (53) 53 (53) 72 (47) 97 (43) 84 (46) 80 (47) 56 (54) 80 (49) 52 (54) 65 (52) 53 (54)
Vietnam 129 (32) 90 (44) 77 (46) 85 (46) 62 (52) 81 (47) 80 (48) 56 (54) 74 (50) 73 (50) 125 (36)
Macedonia,
FYR 66 (49) 56 (53) 40 (59) 40 (58) 51 (54) 82 (46) 52 (54) 50 (55) 61 (53) 57 (54) 59 (51)
Saudi Arabia 35 (60) 94 (43) 68 (48) 73 (48) 100 (42) 83 (46) 87 (46) 95 (44) 84 (48) 63 (53) 34 (58)
Chad 112 (37) 110 (39) 92 (42) 79 (47) 81 (46) 84 (46) 127 (34) 129 (32) 131 (33) 118 (35) 118 (39)
Belize 57 (52) 44 (56) 119 (35) 108 (41) 68 (50) 85 (45) 37 (60) 40 (59) 47 (56) 64 (52) 65 (50)
China 98 (42) 66 (50) 51 (54) 58 (52) 76 (47) 86 (45) 99 (43) 97 (44) 101 (44) 91 (45) 67 (50)
Malawi 139 (23) 135 (25) 133 (27) 133 (33) 107 (41) 87 (45) 93 (44) 104 (43) 112 (39) 133 (31) 139 (28)
Indonesia 76 (47) 104 (41) 96 (41) 68 (49) 61 (52) 88 (45) 86 (47) 65 (52) 87 (47) 71 (51) 78 (47)
Philippines 101 (41) 122 (36) 86 (44) 70 (49) 48 (55) 89 (45) 69 (51) 82 (48) 106 (41) 96 (43) 83 (46)
Mauritius 54 (53) 68 (49) 56 (52) 84 (46) 73 (48) 90 (45) 82 (48) 79 (49) 63 (53) 56 (54) 48 (55)
Burkina Faso 65 (49) 115 (38) 74 (47) 74 (48) 71 (49) 91 (44) 117 (39) 109 (42) 117 (37) 53 (55) 75 (48)
South Africa 41 (58) 76 (47) 70 (48) 72 (49) 96 (43) 92 (44) 90 (45) 83 (48) 77 (50) 75 (49) 42 (56)
Mozambique 135 (29) 116 (38) 109 (39) 110 (40) 121 (37) 93 (44) 112 (41) 99 (44) 109 (41) 108 (38) 137 (32)
Mongolia 123 (35) 109 (39) 111 (39) 94 (44) 126 (35) 94 (44) 85 (47) 87 (46) 91 (46) 97 (43) 133 (36)
Namibia 90 (44) 97 (42) 101 (40) 103 (42) 72 (48) 95 (44) 72 (50) 90 (46) 99 (44) 119 (35) 79 (47)
Malaysia 39 (59) 57 (52) 89 (43) 93 (44) 103 (42) 96 (43) 100 (43) 81 (49) 71 (51) 82 (47) 36 (58)
Guyana 108 (38) 80 (46) 116 (38) 140 (23) 124 (35) 97 (43) 61 (53) 69 (51) 82 (49) 94 (43) 120 (38)
Kuwait 24 (71) 69 (49) 79 (45) 76 (48) 116 (38) 98 (43) 139 (30) 139 (25) 81 (49) 100 (43) 23 (67)
Oman 29 (64) 47 (55) 59 (52) 61 (51) 122 (36) 99 (43) 95 (44) 96 (44) 56 (53) 44 (56) 28 (63)
Uruguay 73 (48) 65 (50) 73 (47) 71 (49) 128 (34) 100 (42) 73 (50) 48 (56) 45 (57) 37 (59) 64 (50)
Yemen, Rep. 113 (37) 112 (38) 84 (44) 62 (50) 132 (32) 101 (42) 125 (35) 116 (39) 118 (36) 122 (34) 124 (37)
Paraguay 103 (39) 102 (41) 99 (41) 106 (41) 112 (39) 102 (42) 107 (42) 92 (45) 93 (45) 93 (44) 97 (44)
Pakistan 111 (37) 117 (37) 118 (36) 122 (37) 32 (61) 103 (42) 110 (41) 111 (41) 130 (33) 110 (37) 101 (43)
Cote d’Ivoire 63 (50) 95 (42) 88 (43) 124 (36) 80 (46) 104 (41) 113 (40) 120 (37) 114 (38) 123 (33) 86 (46)
Nigeria 97 (42) 119 (37) 117 (37) 114 (39) 54 (54) 105 (41) 101 (43) 119 (37) 105 (42) 92 (44) 81 (47)
Moldova 116 (36) 118 (37) 110 (39) 100 (42) 105 (42) 106 (41) 111 (41) 100 (44) 97 (45) 87 (46) 106 (42)
Uzbekistan 125 (34) 126 (34) 135 (25) 78 (47) 94 (44) 107 (41) 122 (35) 117 (38) 107 (41) 101 (42) 112 (40)
Bangladesh 133 (30) 121 (36) 90 (43) 96 (43) 47 (56) 108 (41) 109 (42) 114 (39) 120 (36) 116 (37) 123 (37)
Benin 64 (49) 73 (47) 52 (54) 95 (43) 89 (45) 109 (41) 96 (44) 101 (44) 108 (41) 61 (53) 90 (45)
Guatemala 80 (46) 72 (48) 67 (49) 65 (50) 91 (45) 110 (41) 94 (44) 107 (42) 102 (42) 88 (45) 76 (48)
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Papua New
Guinea 89 (44) 99 (41) 93 (42) 83 (46) 87 (45) 111 (40) 134 (32) 130 (32) 125 (35) 127 (32) 110 (41)
Nicaragua 107 (39) 81 (45) 114 (38) 112 (40) 99 (43) 112 (39) 75 (49) 78 (49) 89 (47) 105 (41) 119 (39)
India 96 (42) 114 (38) 105 (40) 91 (45) 39 (58) 113 (39) 115 (39) 124 (34) 127 (34) 114 (37) 84 (46)
Iran,
Islamic Rep. 58 (52) 130 (30) 128 (31) 121 (37) 85 (46) 114 (39) 121 (36) 132 (31) 126 (35) 129 (32) 58 (51)
Zimbabwe 110 (37) 96 (42) 98 (41) 120 (37) 115 (38) 115 (39) 105 (42) 110 (41) 122 (36) 120 (34) 138 (31)
Jordan 88 (44) 78 (46) 107 (40) 116 (39) 127 (34) 116 (39) 81 (48) 88 (46) 75 (50) 80 (47) 93 (44)
Cameroon 84 (45) 92 (43) 76 (46) 89 (45) 118 (37) 117 (38) 126 (34) 135 (29) 129 (34) 132 (31) 99 (43)
Egypt,
Arab Rep. 120 (36) 105 (41) 112 (39) 135 (31) 139 (27) 118 (38) 118 (38) 103 (44) 104 (42) 111 (37) 121 (38)
Lesotho 131 (32) 85 (45) 85 (44) 82 (46) 97 (43) 119 (37) 102 (42) 108 (42) 94 (45) 112 (37) 134 (35)
Sri Lanka 91 (43) 107 (40) 106 (40) 88 (45) 78 (46) 120 (36) 114 (40) 118 (38) 110 (40) 113 (37) 89 (46)
Tajikistan 136 (28) 139 (23) 134 (26) 128 (35) 111 (40) 121 (36) 106 (42) 106 (42) 119 (36) 117 (35) 128 (36)
Peru 92 (43) 98 (42) 120 (35) 130 (34) 131 (32) 122 (36) 77 (49) 91 (45) 88 (47) 77 (48) 73 (49)
Kyrgyz
Republic 132 (31) 128 (31) 124 (32) 98 (43) 79 (46) 123 (36) 104 (42) 112 (41) 115 (38) 115 (37) 131 (36)
Uganda 130 (32) 131 (30) 121 (35) 118 (38) 114 (38) 124 (35) 119 (37) 122 (35) 128 (34) 109 (38) 127 (36)
Gambia, The 117 (36) 124 (34) 127 (31) 137 (30) 129 (33) 125 (35) 116 (39) 121 (37) 116 (38) 121 (34) 130 (36)
Bolivia 102 (41) 89 (44) 129 (30) 127 (35) 135 (29) 126 (35) 92 (45) 94 (45) 100 (44) 102 (42) 95 (44)
Nepal 126 (33) 125 (34) 125 (32) 105 (41) 58 (53) 127 (34) 137 (31) 140 (23) 140 (21) 139 (24) 117 (39)
Kenya 106 (39) 123 (35) 123 (33) 129 (35) 56 (54) 128 (33) 131 (32) 126 (33) 137 (30) 125 (33) 104 (43)
Sierra Leone 128 (33) 132 (28) 131 (29) 131 (33) 125 (35) 129 (33) 120 (37) 123 (35) 133 (32) 136 (27) 122 (37)
Mali 122 (35) 129 (31) 122 (34) 102 (42) 109 (40) 130 (31) 133 (32) 131 (31) 136 (30) 134 (30) 115 (39)
Madagascar 140 (23) 141 (20) 139 (21) 126 (36) 113 (39) 131 (31) 129 (33) 113 (40) 123 (36) 137 (24) 142 (22)
Algeria 74 (48) 106 (40) 103 (40) 101 (42) 138 (27) 132 (31) 135 (32) 137 (29) 124 (36) 128 (32) 82 (46)
Syrian Arab
Republic 100 (41) 111 (38) 115 (38) 113 (40) 133 (31) 133 (31) 123 (35) 125 (34) 121 (36) 130 (31) 103 (43)
Ethiopia 141 (23) 138 (23) 132 (29) 136 (30) 98 (43) 134 (30) 132 (32) 134 (30) 139 (25) 138 (24) 135 (35)
Sudan 109 (38) 134 (26) 137 (24) 141 (23) 136 (28) 135 (30) 130 (33) 127 (33) 132 (32) 135 (28) 113 (40)
Senegal 105 (39) 133 (26) 138 (22) 138 (26) 74 (48) 136 (29) 140 (29) 133 (31) 134 (32) 124 (33) 94 (44)
Ghana 134 (30) 140 (23) 140 (19) 117 (38) 130 (33) 137 (28) 136 (32) 136 (29) 138 (27) 140 (22) 114 (39)
Iraq 53 (54) 67 (49) 62 (50) 104 (41) 140 (24) 138 (27) 124 (35) 128 (32) 111 (39) 104 (42) 105 (43)
Niger 119 (36) 136 (24) 130 (30) 132 (33) 119 (37) 139 (25) 138 (31) 138 (28) 135 (31) 131 (31) 136 (34)
Burundi 142 (18) 137 (23) 136 (25) 123 (37) 110 (40) 140 (25) 142 (9) 142 (6) 142 (12) 141 (21) 141 (25)
Liberia 138 (24) 127 (34) 141 (14) 139 (24) 141 (14) 141 (20) 98 (43) 93 (45) 103 (42) 126 (32) 140 (27)
Cuba 137 (27) 142 (12) 142 (1) 142 (17) 142 (13) 142 (7) 141 (9) 141 (7) 141 (19) 142 (5) 111 (41)
Note: The rank details the country rank of each country in that year according to the index value in parentheses. Countries are ranked according to their
score in 2005.
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MIMIC Model and Factor Score for Latent Variable
Jöreskog andGoldberger (1975) developed the formal specification of the approach for one latent variable. It encompasses
a system of two equations: first showing how the unobservable variable in the measurement equation model determines
the examined endogenous variables; and second how the latent variable and its causes interact. The model is formally
characterized in the following way. The independent indicators are denoted by yi (i = 1, … ,m) and η is the latent variable
(i.e. human trafficking) such that:
yi = βiη + εi (A1)
The 1 ×m parameter vector βi = {β1, β2 … , βm}′ embodies the coefficients which indicate the estimated alteration in the
respective indicators after a one unit change in the latent variable. The error terms εi, i = 1, … ,m have mean zero and
covariance matrix θε. The correlation across indicators is exclusively determined by the common factor η. Equation (1) is
a confirmatory factor analysis model for the observable indicators y = (y1, y2, … , ym)′ including the common factor η and
the unique factor εi. In the covariance matrix θε, the diagonal elements are represented in the 1 ×m vector τ.
Moreover, the latent unobservable variable η can be linearly decomposed in the following way:
η = α′x + ω, (A2)
where α = (α1, α2, … , αs)′ are parameters, x = (x1, x2, … , xs)′ is the vector of observable exogenous causal variables
and a stochastic error term ω. The model described in equation (1) is also called a measurement model of the observed
endogenous indicators determined by the latent variable. Any correlation between the elements of y results from the
association with η. The indicators are assumed to be partially independent between all indicator pairs i and j setting all
diagonal elements of θε equal to zero. The second component of the model is a structural equation (2) that characterizes
the relationship between the latent variable and its causes.
The structural parameters α are not directly estimable due to the latent nature of the objective variable. Equation (1)
is inserted in equation (2) in order to derive the reduced form which connects the observable variables from (1) and (2)
via the equation
γ = Π′x + y. (A3)
This is a multivariate regression model which includes the endogenous indicators y = (y1, … , yn)′ and the exogenous
causes x = (x1, x2, … , xs)′ of the latent factor η. The reduced form coefficient matrix has the rank (m × s) = 1 and is given
byΠ = αβ′. The (1 ×m) reduced form disturbance vector reads as γ = βω + ε and has the error covariance matrix:
θω = E[(βω + ε)(βω + ε)′] = σ2ωββ′ + θε. (A4)
The variance (σ2ω) of the stochastic error term has the characteristic structure of the covariance matrix of a factor analysis
model. This error covariance matrix is constrained similarly toΠ because it is the sum of a one-rank matrix and a diagonal
matrix. Therefore one of the elements of the factor loading vector β has to be constrained in order to identify the model
(Bollen, 1989).24 The choice of which indicator is normalized determines the scale of the latent variable but it does not
affect the results of themeasurement.We follow the literature and use the indicator with the largest factor loading (Bollen,
1989).
Accordingly, the estimation procedure and the identification of the model are derived by relations of the observable
data, z = (y′x′)′. The (m + s) × (m + s) covariance of the underlying model defined by equations (1) and (2) shows the
relationship in terms of their respective covariance:
Σ(φ) 􏿰
β(a′Φxα + σ2ω)β′ + θε βα′Φx
Φxa′β Φx 􏿳
. (A5)
Where φ is the vector of independent but correlated parameters β, a, θε and σ2ω. The elements on the main-diagonal are
E[yy′] = β(a′Φxα + σ2ω)β′ + θε and E[xx′] = Φx and the off-diagonal components are E[xy′] = βa′E[xx′]. Applying this
information for the population, parameters are derived resulting in an estimate of the best approximation of the sample
covariance matrix of the observed causes and indicators, Σ̂ = Σ(φ̂). This pattern is driven by the unobservable variable.
Given (5), identification depends on the information in thematrix and whether it is sufficient to provide a unique set of
values in φ. The set of mean parameters will then be identified if q − p ≥ 0, with q = ms observable moments in terms of
structural parameters and p = m + s, which is shaped by the off-diagonal elements. If this condition holds, the remaining
parameters on the diagonal will be identified. In combination, this implies that the necessary condition for identification
24 Following the literature (e.g. Buehn& Farzanegan, 2012; Dreher, Kotsogiannis, &McCorriston, 2007), this approach is used here: one of the coefficients
of the coefficient vector β is fixed to an a priori value, such that the unit of measurement for the unobserved term is normalized relative to one of
the indicator variables. Another possibility is applied mainly in factor analysis where the latent variable is standardized to have unit variance (e.g. Di
Tommaso, Raiser, & Weeks, 2007).
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of all parameters is given by:
p ≤ 12 (m + s)(m + s + 1). (A6)
Estimation of Σ(φ), Σ̂ = Σ(φ̂) is obtained if the parameter and covariance values are chosen in such a way that the
difference between the estimate and the true sample covariance S of the causes and indicators is minimized using the
following objective function:
F = ln |Σ(φ)| + tr[SΣ−1(Σ̂)] − ln |S| − (m + s), 25 (A7)
which is a likelihood function assuming a multivariate, normal distribution. The sufficient rule for the MIMIC model to be
identified is m ≥ 2 and s ≥ 1 (Bollen 1989: 331). Perfect fit would be achieved if the true sample covariance were equal
to the estimated covariance, S = Σ(φ̂). This is evaluated using several indices specified below.
After identification of the relationship between the variables and the estimation of the parameters, the latent scores of
η for each country can be specified assigning factor scores using the mean vector and variance matrix of the fitted model.
This methodwas suggested by Jöreskog (2000) and usesmore structural information than a simple linear application.26 For
this reason the factor score is used for the generation of the final country ranking. The factor score for the latent variable
is generated in the following way:
η̃ = Σ̂ ′zηΣ̂zzμ̂z + μ̂η (A8)
with z = (y′x′)′ the vector of all observable causes and indicators from equation (3), Z = (z′η′)′ the vector of all variables
of the model, μ̂Z = μ̂zμ̂eta is the fitted mean of Z and
Σ̂Z = 􏿶
Σ̂zz Σ̂zη
Σ̂ ′zη Σ̂ηη􏿹
is the fitted variance. Thus, the factor score is the fitted mean prediction of the latent variable, similar to prediction of the
dependent variable in regression models and weighted by minimizing the objective function (7). The score of the latent
variable is subsequently obtained by implementing these weights, the estimated coefficients of the measurement and
the structural model in equation (8). Finally, the model is applied to measure the extent of human trafficking in destina-
tion countries. The graphic representation is a path diagram. The respective path diagram of the MIMIC model of human
trafficking can be found in the article.
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